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The class inclusion question: a 




For more than 70 years, Piaget’s class-inclusion task (given, e.g., five asters and three tulips, the child is asked whether 
“there are more asters or more flowers”) has been the object of experimental investigation. Inclusion is of consider-
able importance for cognitive science as it is a key concept for logical operations and knowledge representation. It is 
shown that the question can be characterised by a kind of privative ambiguity which is at the source of the younger 
children’s answer, “more asters”. A relevance-theoretic explanation of children’s interpretation of the question and 
of the subsequent responses is expounded. This account can explain the effect of all the factors that are known to 
influence performance (e.g., role of collections, counting, typicality, qualification, syntax, etc.), a review of which is 
presented. It is further tested experimentally. The development of performance is explained on the basis of the way 
children disambiguate the question. This study exemplifies the two ways in which pragmatic analysis is pertinent to 
the study of children’s (as well as adults’) reasoning and judgement, namely in explaining and predicting participants’ 
comprehension of the statements and questions, and in taking into account attribution processes that occur in the 
experimental setting.
Keywords: Cognitive development, Class inclusion, Categorisation, Privative ambiguity, Relevance theory
© 2016 The Author(s). This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, 
and indicate if changes were made.
Background
Since its first appearance more than 70  years ago (Pia-
get and Szeminska 1941) the class inclusion question has 
given rise to countless investigations. Consider the para-
digmatic case. A child is presented with the picture of a 
set of, say, seven flowers comprising two subsets of five 
asters and two tulips. When young children are asked, 
“Are there more asters or more flowers” (the standard 
form of the class inclusion question), the typical answer is 
that there are more asters. These children are said to fail 
the class inclusion question. Conventionally, a population 
is deemed to pass the question when the criterion of 50 % 
of answers “there are more flowers” is reached. Averag-
ing across studies, this occurs between eight and nine 
years of age among school children in the western world 
(Winer 1980). The significance of this result in relation to 
the existence of many factors that influence performance 
has been hotly debated, both inside and outside Piagetian 
theory, with a peak in the 1970s and 1980s.
The concept of inclusion is of considerable importance 
for cognitive science. The theoretical interest to explain 
when and how an awareness that the whole is more than 
one of its parts emerges in children’s cognition is uncon-
troversial. And how hierarchical categories are learned, 
represented and exploited is one of the major problems 
of knowledge representation. The human mind has the 
remarkable capability to treat a set and one of its sub-
sets simultaneously, that is, treat the extension of a sub-
set while recognising at the same time that its members 
belong to an including set. At a mature level of develop-
ment, this manifests itself, in particular, by the ability to 
consider one given entity as an A or a B (with B included 
in A) simultaneously. Earlier in development, the child 
learns that a name can refer both to a basic level and a 
superordinate level. Using a variety of experimental 
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procedures, many studies have addressed the question 
of the conditions that foster this ability and of the age 
at which it emerges. Because there is evidence that this 
occurs as early as three years of age (Blewitt 1994; Cal-
lanan 1989; Diesendruck and Shatz, 2001; Johnson et al. 
1997; Mervis et  al. 1994; Nguyen and Murphy 2003; 
Taylor and Gelman 1989; Waxman and Hatch 1992) the 
fact that success on the class inclusion question appears 
about 5 years later seems deeply mysterious.
This paper aims to re-examine the class inclusion prob-
lem in the light of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1995). It will be organised as follows. To begin with, a 
fundamental distinction between two psychological lev-
els of attainment of inclusion will be recalled. Then, the 
pragmatic analysis of the task will be developed and an 
explanation of the performance will be presented. An 
interpretation of the influence of the various factors 
known to affect performance will follow. Next, a num-
ber of experiments that test the pragmatic approach will 
be described, some of which give an explanation for the 
late success at the task. Finally, two other theoretical 
approaches will be considered.
A fundamental distinction
The following notations will be used. We will be con-
cerned with classes, most of the time partitioned into 
two. One class, called the superclass (noted A) includes 
two classes, B and B’, called the subclasses. B, which has 
the greater extension, is called the major subclass and 
its complementary B’ is called the minor subclass. The 
names used to denote A (e.g., flower) on one hand, and B 
and B’ (aster, tulip) on the other hand are the hypernym, 
and the hyponyms (majority, minority), respectively.
Piaget was interested in the judgement of the necessity 
of the inclusion of a part in the whole, as this is the hall-
mark of the achievement of a formal structure. For this, 
two conditions must be met: (i) the whole class must be 
permanent to conserve its extension when the child con-
siders the subclass, and (ii) the subclass must be charac-
terisable by subtraction, that is, B’ must be understood as 
the A that are not B (as well as A is the union of B and B’), 
which defines the organisation of class addition and sub-
traction within a reversible system. In Piagetian theory, 
its is assumed that children’s incorrect response to the 
class inclusion question is due to a comparison of B with 
its complementary B’. The reason for this comparison is 
that the quality of the whole class A has been transferred 
to B’, which in turn is due to the absence of attainment of 
the reversible system: When the child isolates B by sub-
traction, the whole class A stops existing (and vice versa, 
when the child adds B and B’ to constitute the whole, 
each subset stops existing). Within the Piagetian frame-
work, the class inclusion question is valid internally (by 
construct) and externally in the sense that the interview 
methodology enables the experimenters to ascertain 
their judgement by analysing the child’s justifications and 
by looking for resistance to counter-suggestions.
Now a different and more simple use of the task can 
be made. As Smith (1982) has cogently argued, studying 
whether children answer the class inclusion question cor-
rectly may correspond to another research interest, such 
as, “Are children aware, on the basis of the observation, that 
there is more in the class than in the subclass presented to 
them”. Indeed, investigators in the Piagetian tradition used 
to carefully distinguish empirical solving and logical solv-
ing (Bideaud and Lautrey 1983). Outside Piagetian theory 
this question, which can be called the simple judgement of 
inclusion, has been the focus of most researchers’ interest. 
This interest is justified because the simple judgement is 
the one that is relevant to fundamental aspects of knowl-
edge representation such as the acquisition of hierarchical 
classifications. The simple judgement differs deeply from 
a judgement of necessity. Structurally, the latter results 
from a deductive system, which is not the case for the for-
mer. Functionally, the essential difference is that the sim-
ple judgement requires empirical knowledge whereas the 
necessity judgement needs no observation. More impor-
tantly, the necessity judgement requires of the child a 
meta-knowledge, that is, the use of a principle that is built 
upon the knowledge at work in the simple judgement.
This notion seems to be widely accepted. For example 
Mandler (1983) suggests that “to answer the typical class-
inclusion questions may require the ability to reflect on 
the implications of one’s knowledge” (p. 120). In consid-
ering conscious abstraction as one of the conditions of 
the understanding of the class inclusion question Piaget 
(1977) explicitly and specifically expressed this view. Neo-
Piagetians such as Moshman and Timmons (1982) posit 
that the development of metacognition is one of the pro-
cesses at the origin of logical necessity. Moshman (1990) 
regards metacognitive awareness as the very object of the 
development of logical reasoning beyond the age of 5 or 6.
Ironically, cognitive psychologists who are interested in 
the simple judgement of inclusion have adopted the Pia-
getian class inclusion question, which was designed, and 
is valid, for the judgement of necessity, without question-
ing its validity to study the simple judgement. Based on 
a pragmatic analysis of the task, it will be claimed in the 
present paper that it is invalid. A modified question that 
is valid will be proposed, from which a different, more 
correct, developmental pattern of performance for the 
simple judgement will follow.
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The pragmatic analysis
In this section, we will perform a detailed analysis of the 
task, which includes a linguistic analysis of the ques-
tion, and an examination of the peculiarities of the rela-
tionship between the experimenter and the child in the 
experimental setting, following an approach detailed in 
Politzer (1993) and summarised in Politzer (2004) based 
on relevance theory.
Referential ambiguity and the inclusive versus exclusive 
comparisons
A classic riddle among school children is “What barks 
but is not a dog?” Solving it at once may be hard even for 
adults, for reasons that are cognitively interesting. Read-
ers who have failed to find the answer, “a bitch”, probably 
feel both that they should have been able to answer and 
that they have been cheated–indeed both intuitions are 
correct. The pair dog (generic)—bitch completed with dog 
(male) is of course an instance of lexical markedness, dog 
providing an instance of autohyponymy. That lexemes 
such as dog can refer to the class of all the dogs (dog0) or 
to the included class of male dogs (dog1) is exploited in 
the riddle and sometimes referred to as privative ambi-
guity. What barks (a class that uniquely characterises 
dog0) and is not a dog0 belongs to an empty class (bark-
ing while not being a dog0 is contradictory), hence the 
failure to find a solution. What barks (dog0) and is not a 
dog1 defines the class-solution, bitch. If initially you have 
the interpretation dog1, you get it right immediately and 
there is no riddle proper. Assuming that initially you have 
the interpretation dog0, you get it right or not depend-
ing on whether or not you shift your interpretation from 
dog0 to dog1. Of course, one could imagine a reverse 
riddle, in which the initial interpretation is dog1 but the 
required construal to get the solution is dog0: “Are there 
more bitches or more dogs” would be one such ques-
tion where in the vicinity of bitch, dog1 is a more likely 
interpretation than dog0. We will say that a comparison 
of bitch with dog1 is exclusive (or contrastive) and a com-
parison of bitch with dog0 is inclusive.
Now consider the class inclusion question, “Are there 
more asters or more flowers”. The subclass to superclass 
structure is identical but there is a lexical difference: 
Whereas the complementary class dog1 is not lexical-
ised, in the class inclusion question the complementary 
class is lexicalised (the tulips). However, using a hyper-
nym (in the plural) to refer indifferently to a superclass 
or to one of its subclasses is always correct literally and 
generally appropriate in ordinary speech (the exceptions 
stem from a possible distance between the subclass and 
the basic level: Microbes generally are not felicitously 
called animals). The hypernym is potentially ambigu-
ous and it is the context of the utterance that guides the 
interpretation. Coming back to the standard class inclu-
sion question, “Are there more asters or more flowers” it 
is clear that depending on the context, it may be relevant 
to give it either interpretation: (i) “Are there more asters 
or more tulips (flower1)” or (ii) “Are there more asters 
or more flowers0.” In the first case the children make an 
exclusive comparison and answer that there are more 
asters, the response that is deemed to be incorrect; in 
the second case they make an inclusive comparison and 
answer that there are more flowers, for which they are 
credited with a correct response.
In sum, the foregoing analysis reveals the nature of the 
class inclusion question, namely a riddle in an experi-
mental setting. There is something queer in the question 
which would not be used naturally. A speaker would nor-
mally exploit one of the various linguistic devices avail-
able to disambiguate the question. To invite an exclusive 
construal one would use the name of the class B’, or if it 
is unknown or not lexicalised use a qualifier or a deictic 
marker. To invite an inclusive construal one would use 
the quantifier all (which would oblige one to use a dif-
ferent sentence: “What is more, the asters or all the 
flowers?”).
Interestingly, the triangular structure is often exploited 
for rhetorical reasons, in particular in advertisements. A 
commercial slogan (popular in the 1980s) such as “Don’t 
buy a car, buy a Saab” has a real impact. Here the sen-
tence initially understood as “Don’t buy a car0… ” yields a 
contradiction as a Saab is a car0. Reinterpreted as “Don’t 
buy a car1…” (in which car1 is the class of cars that are not 
Saab), it gets the exclusive interpretation. The cognitive 
effort is worthwhile in terms of effect as the hearer ends 
up with “buy a Saab” and “don’t buy a car that is not a 
Saab”.
We now turn to the determination of the relevance of 
the question, which depends on the interaction between 
the child and the experimenter.
Determining the relevance of the question
Hayes (1972) remarked that the way the class inclu-
sion question is interpreted constitutes a developmental 
variable. This is a fundamental insight. Once this view 
is adopted, the disambiguation of the question must be 
envisaged in relation to the child’s development. From the 
notion that the children attempt to render the question 
optimally relevant it follows that the way they do so will 
vary with their cognitive development. In other words, 
the interpretation chosen by the children is constrained 
by their level of development. Therefore, the interpreta-
tion can be predicted on the basis of what is likely to be 
the children’s estimation of the relevance of the question.
To specify what it means for the question to be rele-
vant, we need to analyse the relationship between the 
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child and the experimenter. A question is relevant when 
it can give rise to an answer that is relevant for the ques-
tioner, that is, the answer should satisfy the expectation 
of relevance attributed by the questionee to the ques-
tioner1. However, experimental settings have (in common 
with instructional settings) a specific feature characteris-
tic of the testing situations: It was noted long ago (Searle 
1969 p. 66) that the question is a higher order question. 
In testing situations, when a question of the type “Is it the 
case that S?” is asked, the answer “yes” or “no” is irrele-
vant to the questioner; what is relevant is to know 
whether the questionee knows whether it the case that S, 
which the questionee is aware of. This applies to school 
age children who are exposed to this kind of questioning 
through repeated interaction with teachers. In the frame 
of an experiment, which generally takes place at school, 
participants cannot fail to identify that the question 
belongs to this conventional genre.
Now the identification of the kind of knowledge which 
the child expects the experimenter to wish him or her 
to exhibit is necessarily bounded by two kinds of limit, 
which are the child’s own knowledge, and as crucially 
the child’s meta-knowledge. Obviously the children can-
not attribute to the experimenter an interest in knowl-
edge that they do not possess themselves; and not any 
more to knowledge that they possess but are not aware 
of. This implies that the children attribute an interest in 
what they feel is a difficult acquisition (often some skill or 
piece of knowledge being currently learned), that repre-
sents a respectable achievement worthy of consideration. 
Consider now the younger children who are requested 
to make a quantitative comparison (more B or more A?). 
The capability they wish to demonstrate, and in which 
they will attribute an interest to the experimenter, is that 
of counting and making additions. This is a fundamen-
tal school acquisition, highly valorised. They can achieve 
this demonstration by making either comparison, but are 
these equally likely to be chosen?
Consider first the younger children, typically five to 
seven years old, who are in a situation where they have 
the choice between an exclusive and an inclusive com-
parison. There are two main differences between these 
1 Before later developments of pragmatic theory a few investigators of child 
development demonstrated the crucial role of the attribution of intentions 
by the child to the experimenter. For example, McGarrigle and Donaldson 
(1975) showed a sharp increase in performance on conservation of length 
and number when the intervention on the materials was non intentional 
(a Teddy bear’s action) rather than intentional (the experimenter’s action). 
Since this pioneering study, several investigators have developed theoretical 
and empirical work on the role of participants’ and respondents’ expecta-
tions about experimenter’s and inquirer’s intentions (Bless et al. 1993; Hil-
ton 1995; Norenzayan and Schwarz 1999; Schwarz 1996) and concerning 
children (Siegal 1997).
two possibilities. One, the exclusive comparison is 
numerically easier as it requires to compare the number 
of asters with the number of tulips (B and B’) whereas 
the inclusive comparison requires to compare the num-
ber of asters with the number of asters + the number of 
tulips (B and B + B’). Second, the inclusive comparison 
does not match the child’s experience (nor the adult’s 
for that matter) as it hardly has any ecological validity. 
Indeed comparisons in daily life concern exclusive or, less 
typically, overlapping classes, and hardly ever included 
classes. These two differences concur to give the exclu-
sive comparison a definite advantage: It is easier. Because 
it enables the child to achieve the same result for the least 
effort, the exclusive comparison has the greatest chance 
of being chosen.
Consider next the older children, typically 8 years old 
and above. The elementary arithmetic skills are already 
an objective of the past (even in case they are not actu-
ally attained); their mastery cannot constitute an achieve-
ment worth demonstrating to the experimenter. But what 
is currently emerging is metacognition in the linguistic 
domain (Gombert 1992) and the logical domain (Mosh-
man 1990; in particular, logical necessity: Cormier and 
Dagenais 1983; Miller et al. 2000). Significantly, it is from 
about 8 years onwards that children start to understand 
riddles based on semantic ambiguity (Bernstein 1986; 
Kilcher 1991; Shultz 1974; Shultz and Horibe 1974; Sut-
ton-Smith 1976) and about the same age that they start 
to offer a majority of metalinguistic explanations in 
response to requests to explain the use of linguistic items 
(Karmiloff-Smith 1986). The contemporaneous character 
of the emergence of metacognition (logical and linguistic, 
including awareness of semantic ambiguity) on one hand, 
and success on the class inclusion question on the other 
hand is no coincidence: The former is a condition for the 
latter.
Essentially, when the logical concept of inclusion has 
been acquired, this provides the kind of knowledge that 
the child assumes to be of interest to the experimenter 
and worth showing her. There is an additional piece of 
knowledge that the child may wish to exhibit, namely 
that the hypernym is ambiguous and that it is better to 
disambiguate by referring to the superclass rather than to 
the minor subclass B’ because if the experimenter wished 
to refer to B’ she would have used its name.2 In brief, of 
the two comparisons, the inclusive one now is by far the 
more relevant. One may add another possible reason to 
use the inclusive comparison, which concerns children at 
an intermediate level of development. They might make 
this choice for exactly the opposite reasons why the 
2 Anecdotically, it is not uncommon for children at this age to demonstrate 
amusement and satisfaction by a smile accompanying their response: You 
and me know what the smart response is.
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younger ones who wished to demonstrate their arithme-
tic skills opted for the exclusive interpretation. This time, 
opting for the inclusive interpretation amounts to mak-
ing the most difficult calculation, but the increase in 
effort is offset by an important increase in effect (pre-
cisely showing their capability of executing the most dif-
ficult calculation).
To summarise: depending on their metacognitive 
development the children can disambiguate the class 
inclusion question in two ways. The younger make the 
question relevant by interpreting it as a request for an 
exclusive comparison of the subclasses; the older, by 
interpreting it as request for an inclusive comparison of 
a subclass and the superclass. The choice is constrained 
both by the cognitive and metacognitive capabilities 
in the logical or linguistic domains. The standard class 
inclusion question cannot be a valid test of the simple 
inclusion judgement because the child is not given a fair 
opportunity to compare a subclass with the superclass, 
so that failure does not demonstrate that the child does 
not possess the knowledge that the part is included in 
the whole. (On the contrary, the standard class inclusion 
question, provided it is supplemented with justification, 
may be a valid test of the knowledge of the necessity that 
the part is included in the whole, as failure is incompat-
ible with the attainment of the required metacognitive 
knowledge).
The factors that affect performance
In this section the various factors known to affect perfor-
mance on the class inclusion question will be reviewed, 
and it will be shown that in all cases their effect can be 
explained by the hypothesis of the referential ambiguity 
of the hypernym.
Classes versus collections
The most powerful of the factors that affect performance 
is the replacement of classes by collections. Markman 
(1973) used materials such as six dogs (four small, two 
big) and compared two questions: The class question, 
“Who would have more pets, someone who owned 
the baby dogs or someone who owned the dogs?” and 
the collection question in which the collection name 
replaced the final occurrence of the hypernym: “Who 
[…..] who owned the family”. The author reports that 
more than 50  % of 7-year-olds passed the collection 
question whereas none of them passed the class ques-
tion. The study was motivated by the observation that it 
is permissible to designate the subclass by the hypernym, 
so that if the children are set to make subclass compari-
sons (for cognitive, linguistic or perceptive reasons), they 
may be encouraged to misinterpret the question, which 
cannot occur with collections as it is not possible to 
designate the subclass by the word “family”. Surprisingly, 
even though the ambiguity is well noted, its explana-
tory role is amalgamated with another factor: This is the 
notion that in a collection such as a family the subparts 
(parents and children) stand in a specific relation to one 
another, which could help apprehending the part and 
the whole simultaneously. This second explanation will 
be considered in detail and refuted later (“Experimental 
investigation of the role of collections” section).
Lexical definition
Applying a modified version of a procedure initially 
used by Smedslund (1964) in a battery of Piagetian tests, 
Carpendale et  al. (1996) asked an exclusive comparison 
(“more horses or more cows”) as a preliminary question 
that preceded the class inclusion question proper (“more 
horses or more animals”). This resulted in a substantial 
increase in performance which can be explained by dis-
ambiguation. Because the initial formulation conveyed 
a request for an exclusive comparison, the subsequent 
formulation by contrast was unlikely to be interpreted 
again as an exclusive request—there must be some rel-
evance in the change in wording—so that the inclusive 
interpretation was chosen by the children who could 
remember the first request. In brief, this procedure indi-
rectly attracts the attention to the difference between 
naming the minority hyponym and the hypernym. It is 
remarkable that Carpendale et al. (1996) discuss at some 
length the pragmatic explanation, but in the end reject it 
on the grounds that they do not see how to account for 
the developmental trend in the performance on the class 
inclusion question.
Winer and Falkner (1984) showed a dog to two groups 
of adults. The first group was asked, “Is it a dog or an 
animal?” and the second, “Is it a dog or an animal, or 
both?” following which both groups were asked a class 
inclusion question (animals, with dogs as a major sub-
class). This was repeated with four concepts. In the first 
group more that one half of the participants commit-
ted at least one error but in the second group less that 
10  % did. This is easily explained under the hypothesis 
that for the first group the preliminary question at best 
maintains the ambiguity and at worst invites to an exclu-
sive interpretation (which will be transferred to the class 
inclusion question); whereas the second group are invited 
to answer “both”, suggesting an inclusive interpretation 
which they will transfer to the class inclusion question.
Other investigators have used procedures that help 
define the vocabulary used in the class inclusion question. 
This includes naming the classes (Inhelder et al. 1974), or 
explaining that the members of B’ are also members of 
A (Bideaud 1981). The disambiguation can be obtained 
even more explicitly by agreeing with the children to give 
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a new name to the superclass (e.g., “round balls” for a 
set of blue marbles (B’) and red marbles (B), while ask-
ing them to compare the round balls with the red marbles 
(Sheppard 1973).
The typicality of the minor subclass
Inhelder and Piaget (1959) noticed that performance 
varies with the concepts used (animals, flowers, fruit…), 
a phenomenon called “horizontal décalages” in their 
theory and which received ad hoc explanations in such 
terms as familiarity or abstraction.
Carson and Abrahamson (1976) manipulated the typi-
cality of the subclasses. For example, they compared 
questions in which the minor subclass was atypical (e.g., 
five dogs and three bees: “more dogs or more animals?”) 
with questions in which the minor subclass was typical 
(e.g., five flies and three horses: “more flies or more ani-
mals?”). The performance was consistently higher in the 
first case than it was in the second. Similar results were 
reported by Lane and Hodkin (1985). The ambiguity 
hypothesis offers a straightforward explanation. In the 
first case, referring to bees by using “animals” is counter-
manded by the lack of typicality of bees, whereas in the 
second case referring to horses by “animals” is invited by 
the typicality of horses.
Quantifying
To make the question sound more natural, Shipley (1979) 
presented 6- to 9-year-old children with a modified class 
inclusion question such as, “Which is more, only the 
lions or all the animals?” Children tested in a within-par-
ticipant design improved their performance by one third. 
This result was confirmed by Hodkin (1981) who asked, 
“Are there more B or more of all the A?” in a between-
participant design. She too attributed the improvement 
to the conformity of the sentence with natural language. 
Obviously, this explanation is circular, as the problem is 
to know why in everyday usage one would modify the 
superclass in this way. In fact, it is not infrequent that for 
the standard class inclusion question the older children 
spontaneously ask “do you mean all the A?” For a speaker 
who wishes to refer to the superclass and is aware that 
the hypernym can refer to the subclasses as well, the most 
economical way to communicate her intended mean-
ing is to mark the union of the subclasses by “all”: The 
quantifier enables the speaker to refer unambiguously to 
the union of the subclasses and therefore to contrast the 
superclass with any one subclass.
Qualifying
Wilkinson (1976) used materials modified as follows. All 
the members of A (houses) had a common perceptual 
feature (a window) and all members of B had another 
common feature (a door). This yielded three houses 
(A), two with a window and a door (B) and one with a 
window but no door (B’). The question was, “Are there 
more houses that have a door or more houses that have 
a window?” The performance of kindergarten children 
increased by 50 % when compared to a standard question 
with usual materials (children: two boys, one girl). Simi-
lar results were obtained by Dean et al. (1981) among 5- 
to 7-year-olds.
Similarly, McGarrigle et  al. (1978) gave a qualifier to 
all the members of A, which introduced a second salient 
feature that should compete with the first (the one that 
defines the contrast between B and B’) and thus discour-
age exclusive comparisons. Six years old children per-
formed better with such a material made of four lying 
cows, three black, one white (“Are there more black cows 
or more sleeping cows) than they did with the standard 
question (more black cows or more cows?”). This effect 
is explanable if one considers that there is a clue for dis-
ambiguating in favour of the superclass. Indeed, it should 
be noticed that the sleeping property does not appear in 
the definition of B (black cows). By contrast, the class to 
which the latter is compared in the question (sleeping 
cows) is described by the sleeping property so that its 
denotation as all the cows (because they all are sleeping) 
is encouraged. A control condition is missing, namely 
one in which the question would be “more sleeping black 
cows or more sleeping cows”, which presumably would 
produce a reduced effect, or even no effect. Generally, 
the existence of a feature perceptually salient common to 
all the A should enhance performance by helping to dis-
ambiguate in favour of the A when this feature qualifies 
only the hypernym in the question. The effect of saliency 
was demonstrated by Tatarski (1974) who presented 5- to 
8-year-old children with three kinds of wooden blocks. 
The first set consisted of six cylinders wholly coloured 
(four blue, two red: “more wooden blocks or more blue 
blocks?”); the second set were painted over one half of 
the surface and the question was the same; the last set 
were wholly bi-coloured (four blue and yellow, two red 
and yellow: “more yellow blocks or more blue blocks?”). 
The rate of success increased significantly from the first 
set (below 50 %) to the second (below 60 %) to the third 
set (above 80  %), the increase from the second to the 
third reflecting nicely the increase in saliency of the com-
mon feature.
The level of specificity
McGarrigle et  al. (1978) report interesting results with 
non included classes. For instance, given cows (two 
black, two white) and horses (three black, one white) 
most 5-year-old children failed the question, “Are there 
more black horses or more cows?” Their spontaneous 
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justifications suggest that they consider black horses 
and black cows. These observations were replicated and 
extended by Grieve and Garton (1981). They presented 
4-year-old children with either equally or unequally 
specified questions. Instances of the former case are 
“Are there more black horses or more black cows?” for 
between-class comparison and “more black horses or 
more white horses?” for within-class comparison. These 
yielded near perfect performance. Instances of the latter 
case are “more black horses or more cows?” for between-
class comparison and “more black horses or more 
horses?” (that is, the standard class inclusion question) 
for within-class comparison, which both yielded near 
complete failure. This was linked with exclusive compari-
sons, as could be inferred from children’s comments. For 
the between-class comparisons, the children introduced 
the qualifier when there was none. In brief, children treat 
the two sub-classes at the same level of specificity.
The results for the between-class comparisons were 
replicated with even greater accuracy by Gold (1984) 
who requested 5- to 9-year-old children to justify their 
responses to similar questions. Among those who failed 
questions such as “more black horses or more cows”, one 
third qualified cow by black, one third removed black 
from horse, 10  % added white to cow. Again, all these 
transformations amount to choosing comparisons at 
the same level of specificity. As McGarrigle et al. (1978) 
remarked, this strongly suggests that the source of the 
difficulty of the class inclusion question does not lie with 
inclusion, as the same kind of comparison is made for 
the between-superclass and the within-superclass cases. 
Children have expectations for comparisons that do not 
match the experimenter’s.
Based on these results, Shipley and Kuhn (1983) pos-
ited the equality in the level of specificity as an explana-
tory principle for class comparisons. They hypothesised 
that there exists a constraint on the selection of the cri-
teria for membership in a class—which they call “tar-
get”—which accounts for the formation and consequent 
comparison of the wrong classes. The constraint, called 
“equally detailed alternatives” is that the set of targets 
corresponding to the classes being compared are speci-
fied in equal detail. This means, for instance, that if a 
value for colour appears in one target, some value for 
colour must appear in the other target(s). If a target is 
red square, the other target must specify a colour and a 
shape. If the experimenter’s description does not respect 
the constraint, the children form a different target by 
adding or eliminating some criteria, so that the classes 
that they compare are not those meant by the experi-
menter. Taking an example with natural kinds, in the 
request to compare poodles and dogs, the breed is speci-
fied in one target; by the constraint it must be specified 
for the other target, so that the child will compare poo-
dles with a class homogeneous in breed.
The equally detailed alternatives hypothesis has the 
interest that it applies to comparisons of included and 
non included classes as well and it seems to be descrip-
tively accurate. However, it is somewhat obscure as an 
explanatory principle, as it lacks a justification. It also 
has a limited explanatory power, as it cannot account 
for a number of effects already mentioned, such as the 
nouns of collections, counting, quantification, or typi-
cality—indeed the authors acknowledge that the con-
straint is not the only source of difficulty. Moreover, it 
seems to lack parcimony as from the present viewpoint 
this hypothesis is derivable from considerations of rele-
vance. As the authors noted themselves, “specifying ‘red’ 
for one class has made color relevant to membership in 
all classes. Essentially, this is the equally detailed alter-
natives hypothesis” (p. 200). In this quote, they used the 
expression “relevance” in a pre-theoretical sense. Theo-
retically, specifying the value of a feature establishes a 
presumption of relevance of this feature to refer to the 
classes mentioned in the dialogue or at least in the utter-
ance. If the speaker takes the trouble to specify the value 
of an attribute for one class, this creates the expecta-
tion of being informed about the value of this attribute 
for the other class; and if this value is not pertinent to 
refer to the other class, this is normally marked by “all”. 
For instance, given short and tall green trees and short 
and tall brown trees, “the short green trees or the brown 
trees” is less felicitous than “the short green trees or all 
the brown trees”. In fact, in agreement with this analysis, 
the five-year-old children tested by the authors did com-
mit more errors in comparing the short green trees and 
the brown trees given these four classes than they did 
when they were given short and tall green trees and wide 
and narrow brown trees. We conclude that the equally 
detailed alternatives hypothesis can be considered as an 
accurate description of phenomena that are explanable 
within the pragmatic framework.
Mentioning both hyponyms in the question
Winer (1978) asked pairs of questions of 8- to 10-year-
old children. These combined a request for an exclusive 
comparison (“more dogs or more cats?”) and a standard 
question (“more dogs or more animals?”), which resulted 
in a higher performance than that of a control group. A 
likely explanation is that the possibility for the hyper-
nym to refer to the minor subclass of cats is blocked 
by the use of the minority hyponym (cats) to refer to 
it. Ahr and Youniss (1970) used all three nouns in the 
question (“more animals, or more dogs, or more cats”) 
and observed a significant improvement, explainable by 
the same mechanism. Unhappily, their participants had 
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already received a class inclusion question, and the novel 
questions were formulated with “less” or with “more”. But 
in the latter case the exclusive and inclusive compari-
sons are indistinguishable because both lead to a correct 
answer, so that the source of the overall improvement is 
not clearly identifiable.
There is, however, evidence that the mention of all 
three nouns enhances performance. This comes indi-
rectly from the investigation of the so-called “verbal 
facilitation” described by Wohlwill (1968). He observed 
higher performance when the class inclusion question 
was presented only verbally without pictures or objects, 
which was replicated by Winer and Kronberg (1974) at 
all ages from 6 to 11, and by Padilla and Romero (1976) 
with 9- and 11-year-olds (but Cameron and Goard (1982) 
failed to replicate this effect). As noted by Winer (1974) 
the strict verbal presentation is accompanied with addi-
tional verbal cues, namely the mention of the minority 
hyponym. In fact the question posed was always of the 
type “if I had four apples and three pears, would I have 
more apples or more things to eat?” That the facilitation 
stems from this confounding factor rather than from the 
absence of material is supported by the absence of dif-
ference in performance between a group that received 
the modified question without material and another one 
with material. Another confirmation comes from a study 
by Brainerd and Kaszor (1974) who failed to replicate 
the effect when using a formulation in which the minor-
ity hyponym did not appear (“Are there more red circles 
than there are circles?”) and the picture was turned face 
down.
In brief, it seems that the mention of the three class 
nouns does improve performance and the reason is clear. 
The hypernym is less likely to refer to B’ (and conse-
quently more likely to refer to A) when the minority hyp-
onym which refers to B’ is used in the sentence: In other 
words, this helps disambiguate the sentence.
The role of the minority hyponym was subsequently 
discussed by Agnoli (1991) within the conceptual frame-
work of representativeness. She presented 9-, 11-, and 
13-year-old children with class inclusion questions with-
out material. There were two question types that differed 
by the representativeness of the major subclass, such as: 
“In summer on the beach, are there more ladies or more 
tanned ladies?” versus “…or more pale ladies?” The rate 
of errors was 62  % and 28  %, respectively, which coin-
cides with choosing the representative class (tanned 
ladies) in the first case and avoiding the non representa-
tive class (pale ladies) in the second case. However, these 
results, which reproduce and generalise those obtained 
by Carson and Abrahamson (1976) and Lane and Hodkin 
(1985), are explanable linguistically as the author noted. 
If ladies tends to refer to the complementary subclass B’, 
an incorrect response is more probable when the hypo-
nym mentioned is tanned ladies (the complementary 
subclass pale ladies is less numerous) than when it is 
pale ladies (the complementary subclass tanned ladies 
is more numerous). The author tried to test this hypoth-
esis by adding a question with all three nouns. The results 
indicate a persistent preference for the representative 
answer but the within-participant design of the experi-
ment makes the result hard to interpret. The effectiveness 
of this kind of modified question will be demonstrated in 
“The factors that affect performance” section.
Learning inclusion
A variety of learning procedures have been shown to 
improve performance. Simple repetition with feed-back 
is one of these (Ahr and Youniss 1970; Brainerd 1974; 
Siegel et al. 1978; Youniss 1971). This is not surprising as 
following negative feed-back the child will tend to change 
interpretation by changing the reference of the hyponym.
Judd and Mervis (1979) asked 5-year-olds to count the 
objects in the superclass and the subclasses (three toys, 
two balls, one bear), after which the class inclusion ques-
tion was posed and the counting repeated if the answer 
was incorrect, and again until success. After this train-
ing a new class inclusion question was asked as a post-
test where the rate of success exceeded 80 % against just 
a few percent in a pretest. This increase was attributed by 
the authors to the contradiction between the result of the 
correct counting (three toys, two balls) and the incorrect 
answer (more balls than toys) which finally the children 
must become aware of. However, no precise descrip-
tion of the process that leads to the answer is proposed. 
A likely explanation is that the child is offered an occa-
sion to disambiguate the reference of “toy”: The hyper-
nym initially refers to the bear in the question, but to the 
superclass when counting so that in the end it is given 
the intended reference. In other words, the counting and 
training procedure enable the child to learn the experi-
menter’s use of the names.
Kohnstamm (1963) was even more directive in explain-
ing that “there are more A because B are also A. B and B’ 
are all A and so there are always more A”, or “they are all 
A and only two are B”, etc. following which most children 
aged 5–7 were successful.
In sum, a learning method for the inclusion task is 
effective if it enables the child to realise that the intended 
comparison is that of the major subclass to the super-
class. All these methods have in common that in the end 
the child has learned the experimenter’s use of the words, 
that is, the hypernym refers to the superclass and not to 
the minor subclass.
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Testing the pragmatic approach
In the previous section we have examined the hypoth-
esis that the referential ambiguity of the hypernym is what 
makes possible children’s exclusive comparisons and we have 
shown that it has strong explanatory power. But to estab-
lish the explanation of the performance that we propose, we 
need empirical evidence supporting two of its claims.
Young children’s referential attribution of the hypernym
The first claim, which is implicit, is that the younger chil-
dren do understand the referential properties of class 
names, that is, know that the hypernym can also be used 
to refer to a subclass. This was demonstrated by Smith 
and Rizzo (1982). In a first experiment, 4- and 5-year-
olds were presented with materials such as three daisies 
and three roses and requested to tell whether a puppet 
named objects correctly or not (e.g., flowers for the roses, 
flowers for all the flowers, roses for the roses). About two 
thirds of the children accepted the reference of the hyper-
nym to both the superclass and the subclass indicating 
knowledge of the referential properties of the hypernym.
The results of two other experiments support the 
notion that the hypernym is ambiguous. In a second 
experiment 5-year-olds were requested to get a set of 
objects, put it back and then get another set; this was 
done in the case of two subclasses (e.g., daisies then 
roses) and in the case of a superclass and a subclass (e.g., 
flowers then roses) by instructing the child to “get the—
and then get the—”. Performance was virtually perfect 
in the first case but did not exceed 14  % in the second 
case, suggesting difficulty in attributing reference to the 
complementary subclass—however children may also fail 
because, as the authors acknowledge, the question requir-
ing to take back some objects already taken is particularly 
tricky. In a third experiment one group of 5-year-olds was 
given the same task as in the second experiment while 
another group received this task with feedback. In addi-
tion, both groups received a class inclusion question as 
a pretest and as a posttest. The no-feedback group com-
mitted three times as many errors as the other, suggest-
ing that the source of the errors is a lack of clarity in the 
reference of the hypernym, which was remedied by the 
feedback as the intended reference got progressively fixed 
across trials. Also the no-feedback group did not improve 
from the pretest to the posttest whereas the other group 
jumped from 20 to 75  % correct. This suggests that the 
training was effective in disambiguatng the hypernym. 
This work is important in showing that 5-year-old chil-
dren know that a hypernym can refer to the subclass and 
to the superclass, and also in indicating—although indi-
rectly—that the hypernym is ambiguous and that this can 
be overcome by a training procedure which helps disam-
biguate the hypernym.
The subclass‑to‑subclass comparison
The other claim of the present approach, which is 
explicit, is that the younger children who fail the ques-
tion make subclass to subclass comparisons. Starting 
from Piaget himself, there is unanimity in favour of this 
claim, with the only exception of Brainerd and Kaszor 
(1974). They based their denial on the results of one of 
their experiments in which they asked children to recall 
the question. They hypothesised that if children referred 
to the subclass by the hypernym, one should observe 
substitutions during recall (the child reformulating the 
question as “more B or more B’ ”) and such errors should 
be more frequent after an incorrect response. Because 
they found few cases of substitution and no differences 
in frequency in a condition with immediate recall, they 
rejected the hypothesis. This clearly is too hasty, for the 
hypothesis is based on the assumption that children 
should reformulate the question in the same terms that 
coincide with their interpretation. This is very doubtful 
as it is the experimenter’s role to define the task, give the 
instructions and fix the use of the vocabulary. If a child 
hears the name A and interprets it as referring to B’, he 
is likely to continue to use the experimenter’s word A to 
refer to B’, especially for an immediate recall.
This is borne out by results obtained by McCabe et al. 
(1982) who asked five class inclusion questions with vari-
ous concepts and only then asked a recall of the ques-
tions: Among the 5-year-olds who answered incorrectly, 
the majority recalled the question in terms of the hypo-
nyms. Further evidence of exclusive comparisons can be 
found in a study by Ahr and Youniss (1970) who varied 
the ratios of the number of items in the subclasses (dogs 
and cats). With eight dogs and no cat most 6- to 8-year-
olds answered “more dogs” suggesting an unsuccessful 
search for cats. This interpretation is born out by the 
answer to the question formulated by “fewer”, which was 
“fewer animals” most of the time. Even more significantly, 
with four dogs and four cats the tendency was to answer 
“same” (half of the children to the “more” question and 
the great majority to the “fewer” question). Trabasso 
et al. (1978) offer further evidence in an investigation in 
which the standard question (“more A or more B”) was 
compared with a question of the type “more A or more 
B’ ”). Whereas the rate of success ranged from one third 
to two thirds, depending on age, it was always above 90 % 
with the second question. This is easily explained if the 
children make exclusive comparisons. B is always chosen 
because there are more B than B’; so, with the standard 
question B is denoted by the hyponym B and the children 
answer “B” whereas with the other question B is denoted 
by the hypernym A so that they answer “A”, which sur-
reptitiously increases the rate of apparently correct 
responses. Naturally, the use of B in the formulation of 
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the standard question is motivated to avoid this possi-
bility. Interestingly, McCabe (1987) has shown that even 
adults may commit errors under time constraint. When 
requested to identify the question asked, subclass com-
parisons were falsely recognised 30 % of the time.
In brief, there is overwhelming evidence in support of 
the claim that participants actually perform an exclusive 
comparison between subclasses following the class inclu-
sion question.
Demonstration of the referential ambiguity in the standard 
question: experiment 1
The claim that the hypernym can be used to refer to the 
subclass as well as to the superclass will now be sub-
stantiated by demonstrating that the spontaneous ref-
erence attributed by children to a hypernym depends 
on whether or not it follows the mention of one of its 
hyponyms. No class inclusion question was asked in this 
experiment; there were only requests for designation.
Participants and material
Thirty children, aged 6;7 to 7;7 (median: 7;1) from a pri-
mary school in a small French city were presented with two 
kinds of concepts: Flowers (five asters and three tulips), and 
fruit (four bananas and three apples). For this and the fol-
lowing experiments the classes were drawn in colour on a 
Bristol board and the children were tested individually in 
an isolated room. Parents’ consent to the children’s partici-
pation was obtained through the school administration.
Design and predictions
There were two experimental conditions with 15 children 
in each. In the AB-BA condition the children were asked 
to designate the superclass (“show me the flowers”) by 
pointing with their finger; immediately after answering 
the children were asked to designate the subclass B (“show 
me the asters”). Then the same request was made in the 
reverse order with the fruit (“show me the bananas”, then 
“show me the fruit”). In the BA-AB condition the order 
of the requests was: Asters, flowers, then fruit, bananas. 
This design allows to vary the position of the crucial pair 
of requests AB (first vs second position) and the con-
cepts (flowers vs fruit). Care was taken to let the children 
answer at their own pace and make exhaustive choices.
It was predicted that in response to an initial request 
for A (mention of the hypernym), the designated items 
would belong to both subclasses because a preference 
for any one subclass is irrelevant: Children will make 
an inclusive use of the hypernym. In contrast, when the 
same request follows a previous request to show B, then 
there should be cases where children designate B’ exclu-
sively. This is because in the context of a previous request 
to show one subclass (B), designating the complementary 
subclass (B’) is now relevant as this materialises the par-
tition and establishes B’ on par with B, which is at the 
same hierarchical level: If you have asked me to show one 
subclass, then it is reasonable for me to expect that the 
next request will be to show the other subclass. These are 
cases of an exclusive use of the hypernym.
Results and discussion
We are interested in the answers to the request to show 
the class A, and comparing this answer as a function of 
its position, before or after a request to show the subclass 
B. The results appear in Table 1 and they are clean-cut. 
Because there was no difference as a function of the type 
of concept, we consider the totals.
Initially children were overwhelmingly correct in show-
ing the A (B + B’), but in the context of a previous request 
to show the B now about one half showed only the B’ 
(and the other half the B and the B’). The differences in 
the numbers of choice are significant for both concepts 
(Fisher test, p < .05). In brief, the reference of name B has 
become fully ambiguous between the complementary 
subclass B’ and the whole class A. Interestingly, follow-
ing the choice of B’, a few children interrupted themselves 
(with their hand hovering above the drawing) and then 
carried on to complete their choice with B, an hesitation 
which nicely reveals the ambiguity.
The consequence for the formulation of the class inclu-
sion question is straightforward: Because the names 
A and B are mentioned in the same sentence, the ten-
dency to interpret A as referring to the B’ should be even 
stronger than it was in the experiment where the names 
A and B occurred in two separate sentences. Based on 
the notion that the standard class inclusion question is 
ambiguous, and having identified the origin of the ambi-
guity, the next step now is to construct a modified class 
inclusion question devoid of ambiguity to get the correct 
performance on the simple judgement of inclusion.
Elaborating a modified question: experiments 2 and 3
A modification to the standard class inclusion question 
suggests itself, namely mentioning the superclass and 
Table 1 Experiment 1
Number of choices upon request to show the members of the class for the two 
materials (flowers and fruit)
A superclass, B major subclass
The request to show the A was made
Initially After a request 
to show the B
Flowers Fruit Flowers Fruit
Child shows A (= B + B’) 14 13 9 7
Child shows only B 1 2 6 8
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the two subclasses in the question. As reported ealier, 
this was already done by Ahr and Youniss (1970) and by 
Agnoli (1991), but with inconclusive results. Experiment 
2 was designed to test the effect of this manipulation.
Participants and materials
For this and the next experiments, the participants came 
from a suburban residential area near Paris. Forty-two 
kindergarden children aged 5;1 to 6;0 (median: 5;6) from 
a kindergarden were presented individually with two 
kinds of concept: Fruit (five pears and three bananas) and 
flowers (four tulips and two asters).
Design and predictions for experiment 2
Each child was asked only two questions, one standard 
(henceforth the standard question), the other modified (the 
modified question). There were two conditions, with 21 chil-
dren in each, that served as mutual control and differed by the 
order of the questions: standard question first or modified 
question first. The use of the two concepts (fruit and flowers) 
was counterbalanced. This design allows both within- and 
between-participant comparisons. Before both questions the 
experimenter made sure that the children knew the reference 
of the subclasses by requesting an initial designation; there 
was an additional request to designate the superclass before 
the modified question. The questions were, “Are there more B 
or more A?” for the Standard Question, and “Are there more 
B or more B’ or more A?” for the modified question. No feed-
back was given after the child’s answer.
It was predicted that performance between- and 
within-participants would be higher on the modified 
question than on the standard question because the for-
mer question is disambiguated as the references of A, B 
and B’ have been fixed by designation and by the mention 
of all three names in the question, so that the hypernym 
must refer to A and the major hyponym to B.
Results and discussion
Table 2 presents the cross-distribution of the answers.
The between-participant analysis performed on the 
question presented first shows that three children 
(14.3 %) passed the standard question (a usual rate for the 
present age range) compared to 10 (47.6 %) who passed 
the modified question, an unusually high rate; this differ-
ence is significant (Chi square = 5.70, p < .01). The higher 
performance is confirmed by a nearly significant result 
within participants: Eight children passed the modified 
question and failed the standard question against two 
who had the reverse pattern (binomial test, p  =  .055). 
Finally, considering success on the standard question, 
it appears that 3 children (14.3  %) passed it when pre-
sented before the modified question against 8 (38.1  %) 
when presented after; this is a significant difference 
(Chi square = 3.07, p < .05) indicating that the Modified 
Question helps improve performance on the standard 
question: In receiving the first question some children 
learned that the hypernym does not refer to the subclass 
and transferred this to the standard question.
Children’s reaction time to the request to designate the 
superclass after their designation of the two subclasses 
was most suggestive. Whereas the reaction to designate 
the subclasses was generally immediate, the time to des-
ignate the superclass (which came after designation of 
the subclasses) was typically several seconds; in fact, the 
experimenter often needed to amend the question (“show 
me all the A”) for the child to answer.3
In this experiment the modified question was highly 
effective in increasing performance. Now because a 
request for designation accompanied the mention of the 
hypernym, one may question whether the sheer men-
tion of the hypernym is sufficient to improve perfor-




The materials, design and procedure were the same as for 
experiment 2. The participants were fifty-one children 
aged 5;10 to 6;11 (median 6;5) coming from a primary 
school in the same residential area. The two questions 
were again a standard and a modified question. However 
this time both were preceded by requests for designation. 
In brief, the two tasks differed only by the presence or the 
absence of the minority hyponym (B’) in the question. It 
was predicted that performance would be higher with 
the modified question than with the standard question 
because the formulation of the modified question disam-
biguates the hypernym.
3 Anecdotically, but significantly, in a pilot study two children stated that 
there were no fruit ("there is zero fruit"), as if after they had shown all the 
fruit (called "pears" and "bananas") it could not be the experimenter’s inten-
tion to ask again for the same extension, so that "fruit" had no reference. 
(On the contrary, the hypernym can still refer, namely to B’, after only one 
subclass has been mentioned, as is the case in the standard question).
Table 2 Experiment 2







Success 6 1 7
Failure 12 2 14
Total 18 3 21
Modified–stand-
ard
Success 2 8 10
Failure 11 0 11
Total 13 8 21
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Results and discussion
Table 3 presents the cross-distribution of the answers. The 
between-participant analysis performed on the first of the 
two questions shows that, as expected, performance was 
higher with the modified question than with the stand-
ard question, as the number of correct answers were 20 
(80 %) and 14 (53.8 %) respectively, which is sigificant (Chi 
square = 3.91, p < .05). This result is confirmed by the sec-
ond of the two tasks (88.5 and 48 %, respectively). It is also 
confirmed by the within-participant analysis which indi-
cates a highly significant effect of the modified question: 18 
children passed it and failed the standard question against 
only one who passed the standard question but failed the 
modified question (McNemar test, Chi square  =  14.22, 
p < 5.10−4). These results still obtain for each order of pres-
entation separately (McNemar test, Chi square, p < .01).
In sum, there is a definite advantage in adding the 
minority-hyponym (B’) in the question, as predicted. It is 
not clear why this manipulation failed in Agnoli’s (1991) 
experiments.
The discrepancy may stem from a difference in the 
order of the three terms in the question. In experiments 
2 and 3 the hypernym always came last, whereas its posi-
tion was counterbalanced in Agnoli’s main experiment 
(and there is no information for the additional experi-
ment). Another difference is that in experiments 2 and 3 
the question was preceded by a request for designation. 
It is now important to separate the respective impor-
tance of the request for designation from the presence 
of the hyponym in the question in the disambiguation. 
In addition, we wish to get the developmental trend. The 
next experiment will attempt to fulfill these objectives by 
presenting children aged 5–8 with four tasks: The Stand-
ard Question and the Modified Question, both with and 
without a previous request for designation.
The developmental trend: experiment 4
The results of experiment 2 suggest that children as 
young as 5 or 6 years old could pass the question if it was 
properly interpreted. Consequently in experiment 4 the 
age range started as early as 4;6 (finishing at 8;9).
Participants and materials
The participants were 386 children from kindergarden and 
primary schools. The age ranges were 4;6 to 5;5 (N = 59); 
5;6 to 6;5 (N = 138); 6;6 to 7;5 (N = 123) and 7;6 to 8;9 
(N = 66) with median ages of exactly 5;0, 6;0, 7;0 and 8;0, 
respectively. Two concepts were used: Fruit (five pears, 
three bananas) and animals (four lions, two elephants).
Design
The children were presented with two tasks in four con-
ditions as follows:
Condition I: (1) Standard question. (2) Modified ques-
tion after request for designation of the three classes.
Condition II: (1) Standard question after request for 
designation of the three classes. (2) Standard question.
Condition III: (1) Modified question. (2) Standard 
question.
Condition IV. (1) Modified question after request for 
designation of the three classes. (2) Standard question.
Condition I was an exact replication of one of the con-
ditions of experiment 2. Condition IV differed by the 
exchange of the order of the two tasks. The first task in 
condition IV cumulates the disambiguations introduced 
in the first task of conditions II (designation) and III 
(modification). In all the conditions the two concepts 
were used in counterbalanced order.
Conditions II and III were administered to the 5- and 
6-year-olds only. Because I was a control and IV the target 
condition these two were administered to all four age groups.
Predictions
We begin with the first task. Performance should be higher 
in condition IV (which cumulates two disambiguating pro-
cedures) than in conditions that have only one (III and II) 
or none (I); the latter two comparisons predict replications 
of the effects observed in experiments 2 and 3. Also per-
formance should be higher with either of the two ways of 
disambiguating the standard question: By modification of 
the question (we expect III > I) or by a request for desig-
nation (we expect II > I). In brief, the predictions for the 
performance on the first task can be summarised by five 
inequalities : IV > I; IV > II; IV > III; III > I; II > I. Notice 
that no prediction is made between conditions II and III: It 
is an empirical question to know which of the two disam-
biguating procedures is the most efficacious.
The second task aims to test a secondary hypothesis: A 
transfer effect as observed in experiment 2 would result 
in higher performance on the second task in conditions 
II, III and IV.
Results and discussion
Table 4 presents the percentage of correct responses. All 
the comparisons that follow are statistically significant 
Table 3 Experiment 3





Success 10 13 23
Failure 2 1 3
Total 12 14 26
Modified–stand-
ard
Success 8 12 20
Failure 5 0 5
Total 13 12 25
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using Chi square tests at p  <  .05 (most of them well 
beyond this level). We begin with the first task.
The results of experiment 1 are confirmed and general-
ised: The comparison of columns I and IV shows that by 
combining the two disambiguiting procedures there is a 
spectacular improvement in performance across all ages. 
In particular for the 7-year-olds, the rate of success jumps 
from less that 20 % to near perfection. Also for the 5- and 
6-year-olds, the conventional criterion of inclusion (more 
than 50 % success) is reached. Recall that this is usually 
attained between 8 and 9 years. Importantly, the rates in 
condition I are typical of the common results, so that the 
possibility that the children were particularly advanced in 
their development can be ruled out.
Next, comparison of column I with columns II and III 
shows that each disambiguation procedure was effective 
separately. It was effective to roughly the same extent for 
the 6-year-olds but for the 7-year-olds the request for 
designation was the most effective. Finally, comparison 
of column IV with columns II and III shows that perfor-
mance is higher when both procedures of disambiguation 
are cumulated rather than using any one alone.
We now consider the second task. We first relate per-
formance on the standard question when it is asked first 
and when it is asked second; this is a between-participant 
comparison. The percentages of success are 28, 29.8, 62, 
and 84.8  % for the four age groups respectively, to be 
compared with the figures in the first column of Table 4: 
6.6, 5.9, 18.7, and 42.4 %. This indicates a very important 
transfer effect, showing that children have learned the 
rule of the game, so to speak, on the first task, that is, the 
conventions used for the names to refer to classes and 
then apply this subsequently in the second task.
The within-participant analysis is based on Table  5 
which presents the cross-distribution of answers when 
the second task is a standard question. Averaging across 
the ten 2 ×  2 sub-cells, it appears that (i) failure at the 
disambiguated question almost always implies fail-
ure at the standard question (in 94  % of the cases) and 
this applies at all ages; (ii) success at the disambiguated 
question most generally implies success at the standard 
question (in 81 % of the cases) with he exception of the 
younger children. It is again apparent that cumulating 
both disambiguating procedures is conducive to the best 
transfer, followed by the request for designation, which in 
turn is more efficacious than the modified question.
Because the hypernym is ambiguous, as long as it is 
optimally relevant for the children to opt for an exclusive 
interpretation, they will compare the two subclasses. The 
results of experiment 4 have established that when care is 
taken to formulate the simple class inclusion question in 
a way that disambiguates in the intended sense, children 
as young as 5 years old can pass it because now they can 
engage in the comparison intended by the experimenter. 
The results show that the simple judgement of inclusion is 
made correctly three to four years earlier than is usually 
claimed in the literature.
There is, however, one possible methodological objec-
tion to the results of experiments 2, 3 and 4 that concerns 
the modified question. Because the modified question 
has been formulated with the hypernym in the last posi-
tion, couldn’t it be the case that the improvement in the 
performance reflects only an order effect? This means 
that the child would choose response A more often just 
because A appears the last in the question. There is some 
pertinence in such considerations as an order effect was 
observed with the standard question (Kalil et  al. 1974): 
The order B, A yielded higher performance than the 
order A, B. However, the hypothesis that order is the 
only factor of facilitation must be rejected because in our 
experiments the standard question too has been formu-
lated in the B, A order. So, if the child followed a heuristic 
to select the class whose name is the last, performance 
should be the same with both questions, but this is not 
so; consequently there is more in the effectiveness of the 
modified question than just an effect of order that would 
reflect a heuristic based, e.g., on an expectation that the 
experimenter keeps the correct option at the end of the 
sentence. However, the existence of an order effect with 
the standard question is intriguing in itself. These consid-
erations lead us to a refinement of the linguistic analysis 
that we now develop.
More on the psycholinguistic analysis of the question: 
experiment 5
In the formulation of the modified question the hyper-
nym A was placed at the end on purpose. Indeed, the 
order of the names is not indifferent from the viewpoint 
of the linguistic theory. When both hyponyms B and B’ 
have already appeared in the sentence, the hypernym A is 
Table 4 Experiment 4
Response frequencies in percent
Task
Request for designation
Standard question Modified question
Absent Present Absent Present
Condition I II III IV
Age
 5 6.6 52.0
 6 5.9 28.5 25.7 55.9
 7 18.7 61.3 38.7 96.6
 8 42.4 97.0
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unlikely to be given the same reference as B or B’ because 
the extension of the subclasses has already been denoted; 
this optimises the exploitation of the use of B’ to disam-
biguate A. But if A appears before both B and B’, there are 
a number of possibilities such as deferring reference until 
after B and B’ have been mentioned, or give A a revocable 
reference that may or may not be revoked at the end: The 
final assignment of A to B’ is not so straightforward and 
less warranted. Experiment 5 was designed to test the 
hypothesis that performance is affected by the position of 
A in the question.
Participants and materials
Seventy-one primary school children aged 5;10 to 7;0 
(median 6;4) were presented with the fruit drawing (five 
pears and three bananas).
Procedure, design, and predictions
One single question was asked, preceded by a request for 
designation. The order of the three names in the ques-
tion was varied according to all six possible permutations 
constituting six groups of 11 or 12 children:
(1): B’ B A (2): B B’ A (3): B’ A B (4): B A B’ (5): A B’ B 
(6): A B B’
We have seen that the best performance is expected to 
occur when A is the last mentioned. When it is not, there 
is an additional treatment and a load in working memory 
which is costly, especially for the younger children. As a 
first approximation, we hypothesise that the difficulty is 
an increasing function of the distance of A from the end 
position. Thus, the prediction for the correct response 
rate is: B’ B A = B B’ A > B’ A B = B A B’ > A B’ B = A B B’
Results and discussion
Table 6 presents the numbers of answers for each group. 
When the position of A is kept constant within the 
three sub-groups (last, middle, first) the frequency of 
A answers does not vary. The comparison between the 
three groups obtained by collapsing (1) and (2), (3) and 
(4), and (5) and (6) indicates that the position of A is the 
only factor that yields a variation in the frequency of A 
responses, with the lowest rate for the first position but 
the middle and first position yield equal rates, contrary 
to the prediction of a decrease from last to middle. How-
ever, the whole trend is compatible with the prediction 
of a general decrease (Jonckheere trend test for ordered 
alternatives, z = 2.06, p < .05).
So, putting A in the mid-position resulted in as much 
improvement as putting it last. This is compatible with 
the post hoc hypothesis that the contiguity between A 
and the last hyponym is necessary for A to remain in 
working memory and have better chance of receiving its 
correct reference, whereas in the first position A is read-
ily lost. Of course, this interpretation needs independent 
experimental support.
Conclusion of experiments 1–4
The experiments reported offer direct evidence that in 
the standard class inclusion question the hypernym (A) 
has referential ambiguity (of the privative variety). Exper-
iment 1 has shown that it can refer with an inclusive 
denotation to the superclass, but also with an exclusive 
denotation to the subclass that is not mentioned in the 
question, that is, the minor subclass B’. The main claim of 
this paper is that the interpretation of the hypernym is 
pragmatically determined as a function of the child’s per-
ception of the aim of the standard task, which evolves 
with age. Depending on their level of development, chil-
dren may or may not adopt spontaneously the interpreta-
tion that enables the experimenter to test their 
acquisition of the simple inclusion judgement. One inter-
pretation (the exclusive one) does not offer this possibil-
ity. Consequently, experimenters who wish to know 
whether the younger children are capable of the simple 
inclusion judgement should attempt to disambiguate the 
hypernym and help interpret the question in such a way 
that the hypernym refers to the superclass, which is its 
intended meaning in the standard question; only then 
can it be considered that the children are put to a valid 
test. The results of experiments 2, 3, and 4 have shown 
that when one, or even better, two disambiguation proce-
dures are applied, the children reach the critical 
Table 5 Experiment 4
Cross-distribution of answers to the two tasks when the second task is a 
standard question
+ Correct, − Incorrect









Condition II III IV
+ − + − + −
Second task (standard question)
 Age
  5 + 8 0
− 7 14
  6 + 8 1 6 1 13 1
− 2 24 3 25 6 14
  7 + 18 1 10 2 26 0
− 1 11 2 17 2 1
  8 + 28 0
− 1 4
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behavioural criterion of inclusion three to four years ear-
lier than is usually claimed in the literature, that is, as 
early as five years of age. This is by no means a lower 
bound, rather it may be the limit that the present means 
of investigation is able to reach.4
Two other approaches to the task
In this section we consider two theoretically motivated 
explanations of performance on the class inclusion task 
and show their inadequacy.
Experimental investigation of the role of collections
We have mentioned earlier (“Classes versus collections” 
section) that facilitation was observed when the name of 
a superclass is replaced by the name of a collection and we 
have offered a linguistic account of it. Here we take a closer 
look at this phenomenon and we test the linguistic expla-
nation against an explanation based on the internal organi-
sation of collections and their psychological coherence.
Degrees of internal organisation
In a number of studies devoted to the comparison of col-
lections and classes (Markman 1984; Markman and Seib-
ert 1976) has emphasised the existence of the following 
differences. The first one concerns the part-whole rela-
tionship: It is a part of relationship in the former case but 
an is a relationship in the latter case. Further, to deter-
mine membership in collections one needs to know 
something about the relationship to other members, 
which is unnecessary for classes. Finally, in the same way 
that the various parts of an object are organised to con-
stitute the whole, a collection has at least some degree 
of organisation, e.g., spatial or temporal like in a family, 
a crowd or a pile. All this contributes to the child’s better 
4 It is noteworthy that in later writings, to explain the superiority of per-
formance with collections over classes, Markman (1989) insisted more on 
the greater ease to represent collections than classes, based on the notion 
that the "mutual exclusivity principle" (the child’s assumption that category 
terms are mutually exclusive) is respected for collections (an object is an 
oak but is part of a forest) whereas it is not for classes (an object both is an 
oak and is a tree).
conceptualisation of holistic properties for collections 
than for classes, which in turn should make part-whole 
comparisons with collections easier than with classes.
Even though the experiments of Smith and Rizzo 
(1982) have demonstrated that children know that the 
hypernym can also be used to refer to a subclass, these 
authors did not exclude Markman’s hypothesis that col-
lections have internal organisation that can facilitate the 
inclusion task. Further, they questioned the feasibility of 
empirically separating the contribution of organisational 
properties of collections from their referential properties. 
We take up this challenge now.
Markman and Seibert (1976) considered the internal 
organisation as a matter of degree. While they used the 
degree of organisation as a variable opposing objects 
and collections, this may be used as a within-collection 
variable: Indeed it is clearly in the spirit of their theory 
to assume that different degrees of organisation should 
result in different degrees of psychological coherence. For 
instance, a tribe seems to have greater organisation than 
a crowd. Is it possible to define criteria to assess such 
degrees of organisation?
To answer this question, we propose four criteria. The 
first two are linked to the nature of the relationships that 
constitute the collection. These relationships are neces-
sarily verified by any member of the collection, and must 
be distinguished from the membership relation (is a part 
of ). They can be characterised by their strength and their 
number.
1. The strength of a relationship is a function of (i) the 
temporal stability (persistence over time): It is higher 
for a village than for a bunch of flowers; (ii) the spa-
tial stability. It is all the greater as the relationship is 
independent of space, that is, resists to dispersion: It 
is higher for a family than for a bag of marbles; and 
(iii) the number or proportion of members that verify 
one or more relationships.
2. The number of types of relationship. It is higher in an 
orchestra than it is in a packet of cigarettes. The two 
Table 6 Experiment 5
Frequency of answers as a function of the position of the hypernym A in the question
Order and group number Position of A
Last Middle First
B’BA 1 BB’A 2 B’AB 3 BAB’ 4 AB’B 5 ABB’ 6
Answer
 A 7 6 6 7 2 3
 B 4 5 6 5 9 9
 B’ 1 1 0 0 0 0
 Total 12 12 12 12 11 12
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other criteria characterise the members of the collec-
tion.
3. The permanence of the members. The higher their 
duration, the higher the coherence of the collection. 
It is higher for a forest than for a basket of fruit.
4. The existence of a function specific to the collec-
tion. Generally, each member does not individu-
ally possess this function but contributes to it. It is 
what justifies the collection. A deck of cards must 
be complete for a given game to be played according 
to the rules; at the other end, some collections only 
cumulate members to reach an amount, as in a pile 
of plates. Of course, some members may have an 
individual function, but this is linked to the number 
of relationships: For instance, the tea pot has an indi-
vidual function in the tea set and at the same time 
defines a specific relationship with the other mem-
bers (“pouring into”).
In brief, it is possible to separate the referential prop-
erties of collections (the membership which is an all-
or-nothing property that they all possess) from their 
organisational properties, which are variable and suscep-
tible of an objective determination. Markman’s theory is 
thus testable: It will suffice to define collections of vari-
ous coherence, and compare performance on the class 
inclusion question using these different collections. The 
theory predicts that performance will increase with the 
degree of coherence. By contrast, the linguistic approach 
predicts no difference because the only pertinent factor 
is the referential properties, which are invariant across 
collections.
Experiment 6
Materials To design weak and strong collections, a list 
of 24 collections was submitted to 10 academic staff mem-
bers in a psychology department who served as judges. 
They received instructions that detailed the four criteria 
defined above and were asked to rate each collection on 
a five-point scale of strength. For the sake of simplicity, it 
was decided to keep only two levels of coherence, defined 
by the four weaker and the four stronger collections on 
the scale. To do so, two statistical criteria were chosen. 
One, a central tendency criterion: The mean rating must 
be <2 for a collection to be considered weak and >4 to be 
considered strong. Two, a variability criterion: No collec-
tion was accepted as weak if any one judge gave it a rating 
above 3; and no collection was accepted as strong if any 
one judge gave it a rating below 3, which is very demand-
ing as it means that it required strict unanimity. This 
resulted in the following eight collections: Pack of can-
dies, bag of marbles, row of cubes, pile of plates (weak); 
tribe of Indians, team of volleyball, jazz orchestra, family 
of cats (strong). Pictures of these were drawn, taking care 
that features such as number of members and disposition 
be equally balanced across weak and strong collections 
because these factors had to be controled for the class 
inclusion question.
Participants, design, and  procedure Thirty-six children 
aged 5;0 to 5;11 (median 5;6) from a kindergarden were 
presented with the eight pictures (4 weak, four strong col-
lections); they acted as their own controls. The order of 
presentation was counterbalanced with regard to rank in 
the whole series and contiguity of weak and strong col-
lections. For each picture the children were requested to 
point to the major subclass, the minor subclass and the 
collection, following which they were asked the class 
inclusion question, e.g., “You will have more cats if you 
are given the kittens or if you are given the family?”
Results The rate of errors was virtually equal for the 
weak (27.1 %) and the strong collections (28.5 %). The dis-
tribution of the number of errors was the following:
Weak collections. Total = 39 (candies = 8; marbles = 9; 
cubes = 8; pile = 14).
Strong collections. Total  =  41 (tribe  =  7 team  =  11 
orchestra = 13; family = 10).
Individually there were no differences in performance 
either: Twelve children committed more errors with weak 
collections than they did with strong ones; thirteen com-
mitted fewer errors; and 11 committed as many errors.
In brief, contrary to a hypothesis derived from Mark-
man’s theory, collections that were sharply contrasted 
from the viewpoint of their degree of psychological 
coherence were treated identically by children in the class 
inclusion task. But this is in agreement with the linguistic 
claim: The class noun allows reference to the minor sub-
class, but the collection noun does not, which eliminates 
the referential ambiguity.5
In fact, other experimental results cast doubt on the 
psychological reality of the coherence concept. If such a 
notion did affect children’s conceptualisation of sets, then 
performance would be enhanced also on other tasks, 
such as number conservation and cardinality; but this 
claim initially made by Markman (1979) was not con-
firmed by later studies (Fuson et  al. 1988; Hodges and 
French 1988).
5 We have shown that the improvement in performance consists in an 
increase in the frequency of subclass to superclass comparisons and a 
decrease in subclass to subclass comparisons. In focusing on these two 
responses and the strategies that lead to them we have not considered a 
third strategy, namely guessing, which has been shown to be present in a 
sizeable proportion of the younger children (up to 40 %, but only among 4- 
to 5- year olds: see Hodkin 1987; Thomas and Horton 1997). It is unlikely 
that random responding could affect ours results since, by definition, it has 
an equal contribution to inclusive and non-inclusive responses.
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The fuzzy trace theory
The fuzzy trace theory of class-inclusion (Brainerd and 
Reyna 1990; Reyna 1991) may be the most sophisticated 
approach to this task. It has the advantage of being part 
of a wider theoretical background that applies to various 
reasoning and judgment tasks.6 The main claim of the 
theory is that mature inclusion reasoning is not quantita-
tive but qualitative; it is pattern based and therefore non-
numerical. The patterns are the result of the extraction 
and storage of a type of gist, namely the familiar relation-
ship of inclusion hierarchy; then they are processed by 
the application of a qualitative ordering rule, namely the 
cardinality principle which states that the more inclusive 
of two sets is necessarily the more numerous. For a 
mature individual, there is an algorithmic procedure to 
answer the class inclusion question: Encode and store the 
gist (“there is an inclusion relation”), retrieve the cardi-
nality principle in memory, and apply it, which is little 
demanding. When solving the task, the child encodes 
both the inclusion gist (e.g., cows are animals, horses are 
animals) but also the “relational” gist (that is, the exclu-
sion relation: There are more cows than horses). Encod-
ing or storage are not a source of difficulty. The source of 
erroneous responding is that the relational gist is more 
salient, hence a tendency to judge relative numerosity 
instead of applying the cardinality principle. In the inclu-
sion task there is a difficulty specific to the comparison of 
the numbers of A and B because this requires keeping the 
whole in memory while one of its parts has been sepa-
rated. (So the theory applies to numerosity at a process-
ing level the analysis that Piaget applied to sets at a logical 
level). The inclusion relation, even though it is under-
stood, is implicit whereas the “relational” relation is visi-
ble and explicit. The two relations compete and failure 
occurs when the latter dominates the former. This imma-
ture reasoning may take place even if the child possesses 
the cardinality principle. In brief, failure reflects a defec-
tive performance, not a lack of competence. For the 
younger children there may be a retrieval failure, and for 
the older ones a processing failure. In this latter case, 
there is difficulty fitting the cardinality principle to mem-
ory for the inclusion gist. This is why it is expected that 
cuing members of the superclass with a distinctive tag 
makes the hierarchical levels more separable. The pro-
cessing of the principle will be more accurate and a 
higher performance is expected.
Brainerd and Reyna (1991) tested the latter predic-
tion in several experiments (inspired by Wilkinson 1976, 
and by Dean et  al. 1981) in which the salience of the 
6 Brainerd and Reyna (1995) exploited the task to study childrens’ memory 
and make detailed predictions about the immediate recall of numerical val-
ues of the classes before and after answering the class inclusion question. 
This is beyond the scope of the present paper.
members of the superclass was manipulated. These will 
not be described here for lack of space. We note that all 
the results can be accounted for within the pragmatic 
framework. For instance, the manipulations that increase 
the salience of the members of A (e.g., red) together with 
a qualification of the hypernym (the red A) are equivalent 
to those discussed earlier (see section on qualifying): They 
are genuine procedures of disambiguation which increase 
the likelihood that the hypernym refers to all the A.
One may wonder whether, reciprocally, the effect of 
all the sucessful manipulations described in “The fac-
tors that affect performance” section and the novel ones 
described in “Testing the pragmatic approach” section 
can be explained by the fuzzy trace theory. The answer 
seems negative. Take for instance the effect of the typi-
cality of the minor subclass on performance. Introducing 
an atypical subclass keeps the irrelevant gist (more in the 
major subclass) unaltered as well as the relevant gist (the 
major subclass is part of the superclass), so that the effect 
is unexplained. Or take the question using three terms 
(the modified question, “Testing the pragmatic approach” 
section). Mentioning the minor subclass B’ does not 
increase the salience of the relation of B in A or decrease 
the salience of the numerosity of the relation between B 
and B’.
Finally, the proponents of the fuzzy trace theory seem 
to misunderstand the linguistic characteristics of the 
inclusion question. Reyna (1991) examined the linguis-
tic account of the performance and acknowledged the 
fact that children’s erroneous answers reflect subclass 
comparison. However she claimed that the interpreta-
tion of the question that leads to error is not due to lin-
guistic principles, but rather to a cognitive illusion due 
to the way the information is presented, which results in 
the child’s choice of one of the possible interpretations of 
the question. The question is recognised as ambiguous 
but this does not create the illusion. This stems from the 
quantitative information, which is unnecessary to solve 
the task, and renders the subclass relation salient. In 
brief, it is because the children attempt to make numeri-
cal comparisons that they make subclass comparisons. 
Reyna put forward three arguments in support of this 
claim.
First, she claimed that the direction of the developmen-
tal data is contrary to the predictions of the psycholin-
guistic account. This is based on Shipley’s (1979) analysis 
which considers the exclusive comparisons as ungram-
matical and only the inclusive comparisons grammatical; 
consequently, as the children grow older, they would shift 
from a grammatical to an ungrammatical interpretation, 
which is implausible. However, this critique is pointless 
because it is directed at a hypothesis that is not part of 
the linguistic pragmatic theory (and is clearly erroneous).
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Second, Reyna claimed that the experimental data 
rule out a causal role for the linguistic factor. This claim 
is based on two observations. One, mentioned earlier, is 
that children requested to repeat the question do not sub-
stitute the minority hyponym to the hypernym (Brainerd 
and Kaszor 1974). We have shown (“The subclass-to-sub-
class comparison” section) that the premises of this argu-
ment are unfounded. Two, Brainerd and Kingma (1985) 
found that numerical probes given after the class inclu-
sion question of the type “How many A were there in the 
picture, a or b’ ?” (where a and b’ are the numbers of ele-
ments in A and B, respectively) were answered correctly, 
that is, the children did not substitute b’ for a. This is as 
inconclusive as the previous manipulation because the 
linguistic theory does not predict that the hypernym in 
isolation should refer to the minor subclass.
Third, Reyna attributes to the linguistic approach the 
claim that the inclusive interpretation of the hypernym is 
the basic one. It follows that older children (and adults) 
who are more likely to suppose that the experimenter 
does not ask a question to which she already knows the 
answer (because the hypernym refers to A, which is the 
preferred interpretation) would be enclined to choose 
the alternative, exclusive, interpretation. Consequently 
one should observe an increase in erroneous responses 
with age. This argument is flawed for two reasons. One, 
the claim is wrongly attributed. The correct linguistic 
approach claims that there is ambiguity and that disam-
biguation depends on attribution processes, which them-
selves vary developmentally, so that there is no such a 
thing as a basic interpretation. Two, the process of attri-
bution is very superficially sketched. It is correct that the 
older children know that the experimenter knows how to 
answer whether there are more A than B’, but it should 
not be forgotten that they also know whether there are 
more B than B’. The meta-knowledge is necessary but 
insufficient to suggest an interpretation. The essential 
point that is missing in this account is what guides the 
child in his interpretation, namely considerations of rel-
evance. It is because showing mastery of the inclusion 
relation has become more relevant for the older children 
than showing mastery of the exclusion relation that they 
opt for the former. The mature child prefers to show that 
he knows that there is more in the whole than in the 
part than to show that, e.g., five is greater than three. 
To conclude, Reyna (1991) misrepresented the linguistic 
account and consequently her arguments to refute it are 
flawed.
In sum, the claim, repeated in Reyna and Brainerd 
(1995), that wording allows the class-inclusion error but 
does not create it is clearly incorrect. On the contrary, 
throughout the present paper it has been shown that 
the ambiguous formulation of the question is crucial: 
Whenever a manipulation succeeds in facilitating a cor-
rect response it does so by suppressing the ambiguity of 
the question.
Conclusions
The essential proposal that has been developed and 
tested in this paper is that the response to the class 
inclusion question depend crucially on the “logic of con-
versation” at work in experimental settings, and more 
precisely on the child’s interpretation of the question. 
The question has been submitted to a pragmatic filter. 
This has been done at two levels of analysis. One, we 
have performed a fine-grained, or micro-level, analysis 
and an experimental test of how a question affected by 
the privative ambiguity of one of its lexical components 
can receive one interpretation or the other, depend-
ing on a variety of factors such as the previous use of 
the names (hyponym and hypernym) by the interlocu-
tor or their order in the sentence. Second, and more 
important, we have performed a macro-level analysis 
of how an ambiguous question uttered by an experi-
menter (or, to generalise, a teacher) can receive one or 
the other of these interpretations on the basis of a search 
for relevance, whereby different children attribute dif-
ferent intentions to the questioner, within the limits of 
their own metacognitive knowledge. In the end, it is the 
interaction between these two factors, viz. attribution 
of intentions and metacognition, that determines the 
child’s answer and consequently the level of performance 
inferred by the experimenter.
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